

PLS 140  
Introduction to  
Comparative Politics

Week 3, Lecture 1:  
State-making

# Recap

- Anarchy and political order
- The state as the primary provider of political order and public goods


# Plan for this week

- State-making
- The making of the British state

# Plan for today

- State-making:
  - Evolution of states
  - Diffusion of the contemporary state

# Evolution of Europe's political geography



# Historical state forms in Europe

TABLE 8.1

Two Dimensions of Hierarchy and Fixed Territoriality


		Internal Sovereignty	
		<i>Fragmented</i>	<i>Consolidated</i>
	<i>Borders</i>	Italian city-states	French state
Territorial Demarcation	<i>Lack of borders</i>	Hanseatic League Feudalism	Universalist Empire Universalist Theocracy

# Historical drivers of state-making

- Interstate war
- Material (and class) interests
- Bargaining
- Administrative innovations

# War in Europe according to Tilly



- “War made the state and the state made war”
  - Tilly, Charles. 1975. “Reflections on the History of European State Making.” In Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Emergence of capable states in Europe:
  - Political dominance and war-making —> war-making capacity
  - Extraction of means of war —> extractive capacity
  - Elimination of rivals + alliance formation






# War in Europe according to Tilly

- The causal pattern of “the classic European state making experience”:



# War in Europe according to Tilly


- Types of states:
  - Coercion-intensive
  - Capital-intensive
  - Capitalized coercion
    - Tilly, Charles. 1990. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992



# War in Europe according to Tilly

- Capitalized coercion states:
  - Popular resistance to extraction —>
  - Concessions (guarantees of rights, courts, representative institutions):
  - “[T]he pursuit of war and military capacity [...] as a sort of by-product, led to a civilianization of government and domestic politics.”


- Tilly, Charles. 1990. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990*. Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell.



# War in Africa according to Herbst


- High expense and limited benefits of projection of power +
- Rarity of interstate conflict in Africa —>
- Lack of external threats to state survival —>
- Direct control only over the political core and low state capacity

- Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.





# War in Africa according to Herbst

- Power “as a series of concentric circles radiating out from the core”
- “[S]tates rose and fell, expanded and contracted, largely in relation to the amount of coercion they were able to broadcast from the center.”




# War in Latin America according to Centeno

- Blood and debt in Latin America vs. blood and iron in Europe
  - Centeno, MA. 1997. "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America." *American Journal of Sociology* 102 (6): 1565–1605.



# Class interests according to Marx and Engels


- “The executive of the modern state is nothing but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.”
  - Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. 1848. “Manifesto of the Communist Party.”



# Class interests according to Anderson

- The absolutist state as “a redeployed and recharged apparatus of feudal domination, designed to clamp the peasant masses back into their traditional social position”


- Anderson, Perry. 2013. *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. London: Verso.





# Material interests according to North, Wallis, & Weingast

- Natural states
- Open access orders
  - North, Douglass Cecil, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. *Violence and social orders: a conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.



# Bargaining according to North & Weingast


- Glorious Revolution (1688) in England —>
- Parliament-Crown negotiations —>
- Institutional reforms —>
- Enhanced the predictability of governmental decisions and better property rights enforcement —>
- Economic stability and long-term growth

- North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *Journal of Economic History* 49(4): 803–32




# Administrative innovations according to Spruyt

- Standardization of currencies and measures +
- Establishment of clearer borders —>
- Facilitation of administration and trade
  - Spruyt, Hendrik. 2005. *The sovereign state and its competitors: an analysis of systems change*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.



# Diffusion

- Out-competition
- First-mover advantage and conquest/colonization
- Intentional mimicry
- Standard acceptance —> world society theory



# Takeaways

- State capacity as the product of incentives to invest in state capacity in specific historical conditions contingent on particular *longue durée* historical processes
- Gradual contingent convergence on the state model attributable to its initial success