

PLS 343

Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa

Week 7, Lecture 2:
Neopatrimonialism

Recap

- Neopatrimonialism as “the core feature of politics in Africa”

Plan for today


- Neopatrimonialism:
 - Characteristics
 - Benefits
 - Variation
 - Consequences

Characteristics of African neopatrimonialism

- Presidentialism
- Clientelism and use of state resources
 - Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas Van de Walle. 1997. "Neopatrimonial Rule" in *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, pp. 61-96.
- Low state capacity
 - Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- State autonomy
- Weak civil society
- Hybridity
 - Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Presidentialism

- Big Man politics
- Personalization of loyalty to the state / nation
- Cult of personality
- Centralization of political power
 - Presidential political systems
- Lack of checks and balances
- Lack of term limits



Clientelism

- Appropriation of public resources and distribution of offices and favors to supporters
- Corruption
- Patron-client relationships

Clientelism

Table 2.7. *African Government Cabinet Size, 1979–1996*

	1979	1986	1996
Average Number of Members	19.1	20.9	22.6
– excluding microstates*	20.3	22.0	23.9
Smallest Cabinets*	Ghana (11) Gambia (11)	Namibia (8) Gambia (13)	Gambia (13) Lesotho (13)
Largest Cabinets	Gabon (35) Côte d’Ivoire (31)	Gabon (54) Cameroon (34)	Cameroon (42) Sudan (38)

Sources:


Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Independent: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ghana-president-nana-akufo-addo-appointment-110-ministers-government-a7636921.html>

News > World > Africa

Ghana's President defends appointing 'elephant-size' government of 110 ministers

Nana Akufo-Addo hit back at his opponents saying it is 'a necessary investment' and that 'it is not going to be a holiday' for ministers

Chloe Farand | Saturday 18 March 2017 15:27 GMT | 

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The Independent Online



Clientelism: evidence from Benin

- Random assignment of villages to clientelist and public policy platforms (+ control group) before 2001 presidential election in Benin
- [T]he first ever nationwide experimental study of voter behavior involving *real candidates* using experimental platforms.”

- Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin.” *World Politics* 55: 399–422.



Clientelism: evidence from Benin


TABLE 3
DIFFERENCE IN MEANS BETWEEN TREATMENT AND CONTROL
VILLAGES FOR EACH TYPE OF CANDIDATE^a

<i>Type of Candidate^b</i>	<i>Public</i>	<i>Clientelist</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Public- Control</i>	<i>Clientelist- Control</i>
Northern	.322 (.032) 208	.674 (.032) 218	.565 (.035) 200	-.243 (.048)***	.109 (.047)**
Southern	.840 (.025) 219	.890 (.021) 228	.741 (.029) 224	.099 (.039)***	.149 (.036)***
Incumbent	.693 (.032) 202	.897 (.021) 214	.835 (.027) 194	-.141 (.042)***	.062 (.033)*
Opposition	.493 (.033) 225	.681 (.033) 232	.509 (.031) 230	-.015 (.047)	.172 (.045)***
Local	.385 (.032) 226	.603 (.033) 224	.509 (.033) 230	-.124 (.046)***	.094 (.047)**
National	.816 (.027) 201	.968 (.012) 222	.835 (.027) 194	-.019 (.038)	.133 (.028)***

Clientelism: corruption

Corruption Perception Index, 2015

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. Scores are on a scale of 0-100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt.



Source: Transparency International - CPI

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Weak state capacity



Hybridity


- Coexistence of informal institutions with the formal trappings of the modern state
- Bratton and Van de Walle:
 - “[W]hen patrimonial logic is internalized in the formal institutions of neopatrimonial regimes, it provides essential operating codes for politics that are valued, recurring, and reproduced over time.”

State autonomy and weak civil society



Benefits of neopatrimonialism according to Arriola

Figure 2
Mean Estimated Hazard Rate and Cabinet Size



Benefits of neopatrimonialism according to Arriola

Table 1
Regression Analysis of Cabinet Size


Variable	1	2	3	4
Polity	-0.686*** (0.145)			-0.530*** (0.108)
Log (GDP per capita) _{t-1}	4.554*** (0.802)	4.840*** (0.772)	3.949*** (1.220)	3.519*** (0.577)
Aid per capita _{t-1}	-0.010 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.024)	0.031 (0.029)	
Oil exporter	-3.704* (1.913)	-3.974* (1.814)	-2.343 (2.818)	
Mineral exporter	-1.136 (1.179)	-1.244 (1.134)	-1.062 (1.481)	
Ethnic fractionalization	5.588** (2.720)	5.613** (2.579)	6.253* (3.595)	4.837* (2.560)
French colony	-0.110 (1.003)	-0.475 (0.970)	0.607 (1.252)	
Log (population) _{t-1}	2.129*** (0.633)	2.309*** (0.596)	2.889*** (0.765)	2.240*** (0.379)
1980s indicator	8.189 (7.849)	8.082 (7.415)	5.217 (9.920)	
1990s indicator	3.736 (5.067)	1.262 (4.677)	0.049 (6.336)	
Full democracy		-11.329*** (2.106)		
Partial democracy		-6.063** (2.446)		
Executive: Multiparty			-6.764** (3.043)	
Executive: Nonelected			-0.007 (2.409)	
Constant	-48.474*** (12.472)	-47.792*** (11.862)	-51.960*** (16.544)	-39.714*** (7.521)
R ²	.744	.777	.614	.703

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. GDP = gross domestic product. $N = 893$ observations. $n = 40$ countries.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.

Intra-African variation



Figure 5: Neopatrimonialism Index 2015 Scores



Consequences of neopatrimonialism

- “The struggle for power was so absorbing that everything else, including development, was marginalized.”


- Ake, Claude. 1996. *Democracy and Development in Africa*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.



Consequences of neopatrimonialism

Incidence of bribe requests, private sector, 2013

Percent of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment request during 6 transactions dealing with utilities access, permits, licences, and taxes.



Source: World Bank – Enterprise Survey


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Consequences of neopatrimonialism

Human Development Index vs. Corruption Perception Index



The vertical axis shows scores in the UN Human Development Index (2013 data, lower values reflect lower development). The horizontal axis shows scores in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (2013 data, lower values reflect higher perceived corruption). Colors reflect world regions.



Source: Transparency International - CPI, United Nations Human Development Index (HDI)

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
Consequences of neopatrimonialism

Table A.2. *Africa's Share of Global Economic Activity, 1980–1996 (as a percentage of world total)*


	1980	1996
Population	8.6	10.3
GDP	2.5	1.1
Value added, Manufacturing	1.4	0.9
Merchandise Exports	3.8	1.3
Foreign Direct Investment	0.3	0.6

Source: Calculated from World Bank, *World Development Indicators, 1998* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998), Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 6.8. Additional data from the World Bank, *African Development Indicators* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997), Table 5.1.

Consequences of neopatrimonialism



Consequences of neopatrimonialism



Takeaways

- Institutional reinforcement of the prevalence of neopatrimonialism
- Strong apparent effects—but danger of spuriousness