# PLS 341 Politics of Development

Week 11, Lecture 1:

### Recap

- Detrimental developmental effects of:
  - Some aspects of sociability
  - Low state capacity
  - •State autonomy

#### Plan for this week

- Benefits of sociability
- Political regimes


### Plan for today


- Benefits of sociability:
  - Cooperation and trust
  - Societal responses to undesirable state actions

- Human rationality and self-interest
- Repeated prisoner's dilemma —> tit-for-tat —>
- Rationality of cooperation
  - Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The Origins of Political Order*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.



- Nunn and Wantchekon:
  - Slavery —> trust —> development
    - Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa." *American Economic Review* 101 (7): 3221–52.









Fig. 1 Trust and Growth (partial plot)


Zak, Paul J. and Stephen Knack. 2001. "Trust and Growth." The Economic Journal 111 (470): 295-321.

- Political organization and mobilization —>
- Ability to exert pressure on the state in pursuit of freedom, representation, public goods provision, inclusive developmental policy-making, etc. —>
- Accountability




# Societal responses to undesirable state actions according to Hirschman

- Exit
- Voice
- Loyalty
  - Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.




#### Voice

- Formal political participation
- Repertoire of contention:
  - Associations and coalitions
  - Public meetings and vigils
  - Processions, rallies, and demonstrations
  - Sit-ins
  - Petitions
  - Boycotts and strikes



#### Exit according to Scott






https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RsTunrXFXcw


### Exit according to Scott

• "Virtually everything about these people's livelihoods, social organization, ideologies, and (more controversially) even their largely oral cultures, can be read as strategic positionings designed to keep the state at arm's length."



### Exit according to Scott

- "Their physical dispersion in rugged terrain, their mobility, their cropping practices, their kinship structure, their pliable ethnic identities, and their devotion to prophetic, millenarian leaders effectively serve to avoid incorporation into states and to prevent states from springing up among them."
  - Scott, James C. 2009. *The art of not being governed: an anarchist history of upland Southeast Asia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.



#### Other forms of exit

- Migration
- Vote abstention
- Tax avoidance

# Rationality of choices according to Clark, Golder, and Golder


- EVL game:
  - Exit
  - Voice
  - Loyalty
- State types:
  - Autonomous
  - Dependent
    - Clark, William Roberts, Matt Golder, and Sona N. Golder. 2017. "An Exit, Voice and Loyalty Model of Politics." British Journal of Political Science.



# Rationality of choices according to Clark, Golder, and Golder

- Lost / seized benefit= 1
- E: benefit of exit
- L: benefit of retaining citizen loyalty (L > 0)
- c: cost of voice (c > 0)

Figure 1: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Game



Note: E is the citizen's exit payoff, 1 is the value of the benefit that the government takes from the citizen in the pre-history of the game, L is the value the government obtains from having a loyal citizen who does not exit, and c is the citizen's cost of using voice. It is assumed that c, L > 0.

# Rationality of choices according to Clark, Golder, and Golder

Table 1: Equilibria in the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Game

		Government			
		Autonomous, $L \leq 1$		Dependent, $L > 1$	
		Is Voice Realistic?		Is Voice Realistic?	
		Yes, $E \leq 1 - c$	No, $E > 1 - c$	Yes, $E \le 1 - c$	No, $E > 1 - c$
Citizen	Credible Exit Threat, $E>0$	E1: (Exit, Exit; Ignore)		E2: (Voice, Exit; Respond)	E3: (Exit, Exit; Respond)
	No Credible Exit Threat, $E \leq 0$	E4: (Loyalty, Loyalty; Ignore)			

Note: The equilibria are written in the following form: (Citizen's first action, Citizen's second action; Government's action). Proofs are shown in the Online Appendix.

#### Escalation of voice

- Terrorism
- Insurgencies and civil wars
- Coups d'état
- Revolutions



iViva la Revolución!

#### Takeaways

•State accountability and responsiveness to societal needs and demands as a function of social pressure