

# PLS 341

# Politics of Development

Week 10, Lecture 2:  
Pitfalls of sociability

# Recap

- Neopatrimonialism and the developmental importance of state-society relations

# Plan for today

- Sociability and its pitfalls:
  - Collective identities:
    - Gender
    - Ethnicity
  - Conflict

# Sociability and its pitfalls

- Fukuyama:
  - Patrimonialism as “the natural human propensity to favor family and friends”
  - Basic building blocks of human sociability:
    - Kin selection
    - Reciprocal altruism
      - Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The Origins of Political Order*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

# Pitfalls of sociability

- Habyarimana et al.'s coin game:
  - Allocation of money by the player to themselves and 2 partners
  - Results:
    - Player anonymous: equal allocation
    - Player visible: larger allocation to in-group members
- Interpretation:
  - In-group enforcement of cooperation-facilitating norms —>
  - Sanctioning of failure to contribute to collective endeavors
    - Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101 (4): 709–25.

# Collective identities

- Caste
- Class
- Ethnicity
- Gender
- Language
- Nationality
- Race
- Religion

# Pitfalls of collective identities

- Pressure to conform and favor in-group members
- Enforcement of political and socioeconomic hierarchies
- Divide-and-rule:
  - Discrimination
  - Political mobilization



# Gender

- Strength of gender norms in human history
- Patriarchy
- Feminist movement —>
- Gender equality as a development issue:
  - International Decade for Women, 1976-1985
  - Sustainable Development Goal No. 5





# Gender inequality



Sources:

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender\\_Inequality\\_Index#/media/File:Gender\\_Inequality\\_Index\\_2019.svg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender_Inequality_Index#/media/File:Gender_Inequality_Index_2019.svg)


<http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii>

# Gender inequality and education

## Gender ratios for mean years of schooling, 1870 to 2010

Female-to-male ratio of average years of schooling, expressed in percents. All education levels for population aged 15-64. Regional estimates are population-weighted averages.

Our World  
in Data




Source: Lee and Lee (2016)

OurWorldInData.org/global-rise-of-education · CC BY

# Gender inequality and health

## Number of maternal deaths by region, 1990 to 2015

A maternal death refers to the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and site of the pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy or its management but not from accidental or incidental causes.




Source: World Health Organization (WHO)/UNICEF via the World Bank

OurWorldInData.org/maternal-mortality • CC BY

# Gender inequality and health

## Maternal mortality ratio vs GDP per capita

Maternal mortality ratio is the number of women who die from pregnancy-related causes while pregnant or within 42 days of pregnancy termination per 100,000 live births.




Source: World Bank


Note: GDP per capita is measured in constant international-\$ which adjusts for inflation and cross-country price differences.

OurWorldInData.org/maternal-mortality • CC BY

# Gender inequality and prosperity



Source: WDR 2012 team estimates using data from the International Income Distribution Database (IID) and the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC).




Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Demographic and Health Surveys.

# Gender inequality and prosperity

## Historical Gender Equality Index, 1950 to 2000

This index is based on gender ratios across four dimensions: (i) Health; (ii) Socio-economic resources; (iii) Gender disparities in the household; and (iv) Gender disparities in politics. Higher scores denote less inequality.




Source: OECD (2014)

Our World in Data

## Women's Economic Opportunity Index, 2012

This index is based on five underlying indicators: Labor policy and practice; Access to Finance; Education and training; Women's legal and social status; and the General business environment. Scores are scaled 0-100. Higher values denote more opportunities.

Our World in Data



CC BY Source: Women's Economic Opportunity 2012 - Economist Intelligence Unit (2012)

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# Gender inequality and political power





FIGURE 1 Women in African Cabinets, 1980–2005



Note: Vertical dashed lines around the mean percent of women ministers are 95% confidence intervals. Data on cabinet ministers are from annual volumes of *Africa South of the Sahara* (1981–2006). Data on female cabinet ministers are coded by the authors from secondary sources.

Sources:

<https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2020/03/women-in-politics-map-2020>

Arriola, Leonardo R., and Martha C. Johnson. 2019. “Executive Cabinets Ethnic Politics and Women’s Empowerment in Africa: Ministerial Appointments to Executive Cabinets.” *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2): 495–510.

# Ethnic diversity

- Negative association between ethnic diversity and:
  - Economic growth
  - Government public goods provision
  - Access to patronage and foreign aid
  - Societal trust
  - Civil peace
  - Democratic stability
  - Quality of governance




# Ethnic diversity and economic growth

- Easterly and Levine:
  - Ethnic diversity  $\rightarrow$
  - 28% of the economic growth differential between Africa and East Asia


- Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (4): 1203-50.



# Ethnic diversity and economic development



## Ethnic Fractionalization vs GDP Per Capita





Sources:

Awaworyi Churchill, Sefa, and Russell Smyth. 2017. "Ethnic Diversity and Poverty." *World Development* 95: 285–302.

Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. "Fractionalization." *Journal of Economic Growth* 8: 155–94.

Source: Alesina et. al (2003)

# Ethnic diversity and public goods provision




# Ethnic diversity and conflict

- Political Instability Task Force:
  - More than half of civil conflicts since World War II classified as (inter)ethnic
    - Source: Ray, Debraj, and Joan Esteban. 2017. "Conflict and Development." *Annu. Rev. Econ* 9 (April): 263–93.
- Fearon:
  - 14% of the 709 categorized ethnic groups involved in interethnic conflicts
    - Fearon, James D. 2003. "Ethnic and cultural diversity by country." *J. Econ. Growth* 8: 195–222.


# Determinants of public goods provision

- Political salience of ethnicity:
  - High in Kenya
  - Low in Tanzania
    - Edward Miguel, "Tribe or Nation?: Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania," *World Politics* 56, no. 3 (2004): 327–62.





# Determinants of public goods provision

- Kenya:
  - Jomo Kenyatta, Kikuyu
  - Political mobilization of coethnic ties
  - Ethnic favoritism
- Tanzania:
  - Julius Nyerere, Zanaki
  - Nation-building
  - Equitable distribution of government resources



# Determinants of conflict

- Strong associations between:
  - Conflict
  - Ethnic diversity
  - Limited economic development
  - Experience of colonialism
  - Low state capacity
  - Neopatrimonialism
  - Authoritarianism



# Greed

- Rebellion as an industry that generates profits from looting
- “Insurgents are indistinguishable from bandits or pirates.”
  - Grossman, H.I. 1999. “Kleptocracy and revolutions.” *Oxford Economic Papers* 51: 267–83.





# Grievance

- Relative deprivation:
  - Entitlement vs. circumstances
- Relative deprivation —> frustration —> anger —> violence
  - Gurr, Ted. 1968. "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence." *World Politics* 20 (2): 245-78.



# Beyond greed and grievance

- Feasibility hypothesis:
  - “Rebels will conduct a civil war if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion”
- Key variables:
  - Availability of finance
  - Cost of rebellion
  - Military advantage



Collier Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. “On economic causes of civil war.” *Oxford Economic Papers* 50:563–73.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (4): 563-595.

Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner. 2009. “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War.” *Oxford Economic Papers* 61 (1): 1–27.

# Importance of mechanisms

- Grossman: greed
- Gurr: relative deprivation
- Collier & Hoeffler: incentives to rebel
- Habyarimana et al.: enforcement of cooperation-facilitating norms by ethnic groups
- Miguel: political mobilization and salience of ethnicity
- Implications: no direct, deterministic relationship between ethnicity, conflict, public goods provision, etc.

# Conflict and economic development

FIGURE 2.2

## Trend in the global economic impact of violence, 2007–2019

The de-escalation of conflicts, particularly in the MENA region, contributed to the 2.7 per cent decline in the global economic impact of violence from 2017.




Source: IEP calculations

# Conflict and economic development

## State-based conflicts since 1946

Only conflicts in which at least one party was the government of a state are included. Ongoing conflicts are represented for every year in which they resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths.




Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset  
Note: The war categories paraphrase UCDP/PRIO's technical definitions of 'Extrasystemic', 'Internal', 'Internationalised internal' and 'Interstate' respectively.



FIGURE 2.4

## Diverging trend in the costs associated with internal and external conflict, 2007-2017


The rise in the cost of the conflict is driven by internal conflicts, which have increased since 2013. By contrast external conflicts have declined since 2008.



Source: IEP

Source for Fig. 2.4: Institute for Economics and Peace. 2018. "The Economic Value of Peace 2018: Measuring the Global Economic Impact of Violence and Conflict."

# Conflict and economic development




Source: <https://www.theigc.org/reader/the-cost-of-violence-estimating-the-economic-impact-of-conflict/preventing-violent-conflict-should-be-a-key-priority-for-development-and-growth-policy/19166-2/#figure-1-impact-of-civil-war-on-gdp-over-time>

# Conflict and economic development

FIGURE 4.3

## Prosperity gap by level of peacefulness, 2016

If low and very low peace countries had achieved an average growth rate equivalent to high peace countries, their per capita income would have been two to three times higher than what it was in 2016.




Source: WDI, IEP

FIGURE 4.2

## Per capita GDP growth by level of peacefulness, 1960–2016

Countries with a very high level of peace achieved, on average, over three times higher per capita GDP growth compared to the least peaceful countries.




Source: WDI, IEP

# Conflict and economic development

FIGURE 3.10

## The economic cost of Armed Conflict, percentage of GDP, 2019

MENA and sub-Saharan Africa are the regions with the highest economic cost from Armed Conflict as a percentage of GDP.




Source: Institute for Economics and Peace. 2021. "Economic Value of Peace 2021: Measuring the Global Economic Impact of Violence and Conflict."




# Conflict and human rights

## Global deaths in conflicts since 1400



Data sources: Conflict Catalogue by Peter Brecke, PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset (v3.1 after 1945 and v2.0 prior), and UCDP v17.2. World population data from HYDE and UN.  
 Notes: All death rates are calculated as the number of deaths relative to world population at the time (deaths per 100,000).  
 \* The Conflict Catalogue figures includes civilian and military deaths. In many instances it counts deaths occurring indirectly – from starvation, disease etc. However, the extent to which these are included will vary significantly between conflicts, due to uncertainty in the underlying historical sources.  
 † The PRIO/UCDP definition of battle deaths refers to those caused directly by armed violent conflict (they exclude deaths from disease, starvation, and also executions of prisoners). The figures include civilian deaths occurring in battles, but not where civilian populations were intentionally and specifically targeted (i.e. deaths of civilians caught in crossfire are included, but deaths in genocides are excluded).  
 This visualization is available at [OurWorldinData.org](https://ourworldindata.org). There you find more research and visualizations on conflict and global development. Licensed under CC-BY-SA

## FATALITIES BY TYPE OF VIOLENCE (INCLUDING RWANDA 1994), 1989-2018



# Takeaways

- Detrimental developmental effects of some aspects of sociability
- Key role of causal mechanisms