

POLS 329 A
Comparative African Politics

Classes 17 and 18:
Political violence

Plan for this week

- Political violence and conflict in Africa:
 - Interstate wars
 - Civil wars:
 - Popular explanations
 - Scholarly explanations of incidence, duration, and termination
 - ~~• Consequences~~
 - ~~• Types~~
 - Genocide
 - ~~• Other types of political violence, e.g. electoral violence~~
 - Recent trends

Interstate war in postcolonial Africa

FP news | analysis | podcasts | the magazine | channels

FEATURE

Africa's Forever Wars

Why the continent's conflicts never end.

BY JEFFREY GETTLEMAN | FEBRUARY 11, 2010, 8:53 PM



How many interstate wars have there been in postcolonial Africa?

What explains the paucity of
interstate conflict in postcolonial Africa?


Africa's states and states-system



Global trends

State-based battle-related deaths per 100,000 since 1946

Only conflicts in which at least one party was the government of a state and which generated more than 25 battle-related deaths are included. The data refer to direct violent deaths per 100,000 of world population. Deaths due to disease or famine caused by conflict are excluded. Extra-judicial killings in custody are also excluded.



Source: UCDP/PRIO

CC BY-SA


Note: The war categories paraphrase UCDP/PRIO's technical definitions of 'Extrasystemic', 'Internal', 'Internationalised internal' and 'Interstate' respectively. In a small number of cases where wars were ascribed more than one type, deaths have been apportioned evenly to each type.

Global trends

State-based conflicts since 1946

Only conflicts in which at least one party was the government of a state are included. Ongoing conflicts are represented for every year in which they resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths.

Our World
in Data



Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset

CC BY-SA

Note: The war categories paraphrase UCDP/PRIO's technical definitions of 'Extrasystemic', 'Internal', 'Internationalised internal' and 'Interstate' respectively.

What is a civil war?

Civil war

- Scholarly definitions:
 - Correlates of War: internal conflicts that count more than 1,000 battle deaths
 - Fearon and Laitin: >1,000 battle deaths overall and yearly average >100
 - PRIO: civil conflict is internal conflict that counts more than 25 battle deaths in a single year








The Correlates of War Project



Civil war

- Why do these numbers matter?
 - Operationalization
 - Universe of cases
 - Empirical leverage
 - Political and symbolic ramifications

Civil war




Civil war in Africa

- Over 1/3 of all civil wars since WWII in Africa
- Average duration: 8 years

Consequences of civil war

- Death
- Displacement
- Destruction
- Reduction of economic growth
- Authoritarianism
- Diffusion
- Cycles of violence



Popular explanations of civil war



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aMXFXNW1rCY>

Popular explanations of civil war

February 21, 2008

OP-ED COLUMNIST

Machetes and Elections

By [NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF](#)

KISUMU, Kenya

Until he was circumcised with a machete in front of a jeering mob and then dragged off to be beheaded, Robert Ochieng had been a symbol of modern, post-tribal harmony in Kenya.

A member of the Luo ethnic group, 16-year-old Robert had played and studied with members of another ethnic group, the Kikuyu. They were friends. And then Kenya erupted in rioting after a rigged election, and suddenly Luos were chasing and killing Kikuyus, and a mob of Kikuyus was running down Robert.

He claimed that he was Kikuyu as well, but the suspicious mob stripped him naked and noted that he was not circumcised, meaning that he could not be Kikuyu. That's when his attackers held him down — smashing his arm when he tried to protect himself — and performed the grotesque surgery in the street to loud cheers from a huge throng.

The crowd shouted war cries and was preparing to decapitate Robert with a machete when the police arrived and rescued him. Doctors did some repair work and say he will recover physically, but as he sat in a church shelter for the displaced here in Kisumu in western Kenya, he seethed with hostility that may never heal.

"When I see Kikuyu shops that have been burned down," he told me, "I feel good inside." Never again will Robert be friendly with Kikuyu or have anything to do with them; he is now a symbol of the primeval tribal tensions that threaten Kenya's future.

Popular explanations of civil war

France 'underestimated' Central African Republic hatred



French and African Union troops in the Central African Republic need to work out how to reduce tension, Mr Araud said

France underestimated the level of hatred between Christian and Muslim communities in the conflict-riven Central African Republic, its ambassador to the UN has said.

Gerard Araud told a UN meeting on Wednesday that African Union and French forces were confronting a "nearly impossible" situation.

They were between "two communities who want to kill each other", he said.

Mr Araud said that calls to end the fighting were being ignored.

France, the former colonial power, has deployed 1,800 troops to try to restore peace, along with an African Union force of some 5,000.

"We have to think in terms of tactics: What to do, in very practical terms, to be effective to prevent people from killing each other when they desperately want to kill each other," Mr Araud told an event organised to mark the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide.

"We knew that there was some inter-sectarian violence, but we didn't forecast such deep ingrained hatred.

"We maybe need to work with psychologists or ethnologists on how did it appear, and now, how to cool down the situation."

CAR strife

Gruesome act of vengeance

Fears of genocide

Journey into fear

Clashes in pictures

What really explains the prevalence of civil war in Africa?

Causes of civil war in Africa

- States-system
- States
- Neopatrimonialism and state-society relations
- Politics of identity

Africa's states-system and civil war



Africa's states and civil war

- Fearon and Laitin:
 - “Most important for the prospects of a nascent insurgency, however, are the government’s police and military capabilities and the reach of government institutions into rural areas.”
 - Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” *American Political Science Review* 97 (1): 75–90.

Neopatrimonialism, state-society relations, and civil war

- Effects of neopatrimonialism on state-building and economic development
- Social control through brokerage networks:
 - Taxation
 - Resource distribution
 - Management of dissent, demands, grievances →
- Englebort and Ron:
 - “Neopatrimonialism can promote either political stability or violent conflict, depending on its level of inclusiveness.”

- Englebort, Pierre, and James Ron. 2004. “Primary Commodities and War: Congo-Brazzaville’s Ambivalent Resource Curse.” *Comparative Politics* 37 (1): 61–81.

Politics of identity

- Roessler:

- Almost no civil wars launched by rulers' coethnics

- Roessler, Philip. 2011. "The Enemy within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa." *World Politics* 63 (2): 300–346.

- Fearon and Laitin:

- The prevalence of interethnic cooperation

- Fearon, James D, and David D Laitin. 1996. "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 90 (4): 715–35.

Independence to 1979	Number of actual incidents	Number of potential incidents	Ratio
Ethnic violence	20	38,383	0.0005
Civil war	52	18,757	0.0028

Some other explanations

- Large populations
- Low income
- Rough terrain
- War-affected neighbors
- Resources
- Horizontal inequalities

Horizontal inequalities: evidence from Côte d'Ivoire

- Economic success and immigration under Félix Houphouët-Boigny
- Struggle for power between Henri Konan Bédié and Alassane Ouattara following Houphouët-Boigny's death
- Political potency of the discourse of (Southern) Ivorian autochthony
- Civil war: 2002-2007 and 2010-2011



Horizontal inequalities: evidence from Côte d'Ivoire

- Langer:
 - No direct causal relationship between horizontal inequalities and civil war
 - Importance of distinction between horizontal inequalities at the mass and elite levels
 - Absence of elite horizontal inequalities → no civil war
 - Why? Mobilization



Horizontal inequalities: evidence from Côte d'Ivoire




Figure 3. Socio-economic prosperity index, 1994 and 1998.




Figure 4. Education-literacy index, 1994 and 1998.

Horizontal inequalities: evidence from Côte d'Ivoire

- Political inequality measure (PIM):
 - PIM increase = increase in inter-ethnic inequalities
 - PIM reduction = more ethnic representation in government

Table 3. Ethnic representation in government, 1980–2003

Ethnic groups	Government ^a																							
	Nov. 1980		Jul. 1986		Oct. 1989		Nov. 1991		Dec. 1993		Jan. 1996		Aug. 1998		Jan. 2000		May 2000		Jan. 2001		Aug. 2002		Sept. 2003	
	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR
Akan	0.49	1.16	0.41	0.99	0.47	1.12	0.61	1.46	0.52	1.24	0.52	1.23	0.59	1.41	0.50	1.19	0.30	0.72	0.46	1.10	0.52	1.23	0.40	0.94
Baoulé	0.22	1.29	0.24	1.46	0.20	1.20	0.17	1.04	0.24	1.43	0.28	1.64	0.31	1.86	0.13	0.74	0.04	0.26	0.11	0.64	0.13	0.77	0.09	0.55
Krou	0.19	1.30	0.20	1.34	0.20	1.37	0.17	1.19	0.24	1.89	0.21	1.63	0.16	1.23	0.13	0.98	0.22	1.71	0.29	2.25	0.19	1.52	0.23	1.83
S. Mandé	0.05	0.51	0.10	0.91	0.13	1.25	0.04	0.41	0.04	0.40	0.10	1.03	0.06	0.63	0.08	0.83	0.17	1.73	0.18	1.79	0.16	1.61	0.07	0.70
N. Mandé	0.08	0.51	0.17	1.07	0.13	0.84	0.09	0.55	0.08	0.48	0.07	0.42	0.03	0.19	0.17	1.01	0.17	1.05	0.07	0.43	0.13	0.78	0.19	1.13
Voltaic	0.14	0.83	0.10	0.60	0.03	0.20	0.09	0.53	0.12	0.68	0.10	0.59	0.13	0.71	0.13	0.71	0.08	0.47	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.66
No.	N = 37		N = 41		N = 30		N = 23		N = 25		N = 29		N = 32		N = 24		N = 23		N = 28		N = 31		N = 43	
PIM ^c	0.36		0.27		0.46		0.47		0.62		0.49		0.49		0.18		0.57		0.93		0.66		0.48	
Ethnic groups	Inner circle of political power ^b																							
	Nov. 1980		Jul. 1986		Oct. 1989		Nov. 1991		Dec. 1993		Jan. 1996		Aug. 1998		Jan. 2000		May 2000		Jan. 2001		Aug. 2002		Sept. 2003	
	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR
Akan	0.67	1.59	0.70	1.67	0.80	1.91	0.73	1.74	0.67	1.58	0.67	1.58	0.75	1.78	0.38	0.89	0.11	0.26	0.18	0.43	0.18	0.43	0.33	0.79
Baoulé	0.56	3.33	0.40	2.40	0.50	2.99	0.36	2.18	0.42	2.48	0.42	2.48	0.42	2.48	0.13	0.74	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.50
Krou	0.11	0.76	0.10	0.68	0.10	0.68	0.09	0.62	0.17	1.31	0.17	1.31	0.08	0.66	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.45	3.58	0.55	4.29	0.17	1.31
S. Mandé	0.11	1.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.13	1.25	0.22	2.22	0.09	0.91	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N. Mandé	0.11	0.70	0.10	0.63	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.57	0.08	0.51	0.08	0.51	0.08	0.51	0.13	0.76	0.44	2.69	0.18	1.10	0.18	1.10	0.33	2.02
Voltaic	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.61	0.10	0.61	0.09	0.56	0.08	0.47	0.08	0.47	0.08	0.47	0.25	1.42	0.11	0.63	0.09	0.52	0.09	0.52	0.17	0.95
No.	N = 9		N = 10		N = 10		N = 11		N = 12		N = 12		N = 12		N = 8		N = 9		N = 11		N = 11		N = 12	
PIM	0.58		0.60		0.78		0.64		0.65		0.65		0.66		0.55		1.22		1.30		1.74		0.74	

^aGovernment: president of the republic, ministers of state and regular ministers. Note: deputy-ministers were *not* included in the calculations.

^bInner circle of political power: president of the republic, prime minister, president of national assembly, president of economic and social council, minister of security, minister of economy and finance, minister of defence, minister of mines and energy, minister of agriculture, minister of interior, minister of justice and minister of foreign affairs.

^cPIM, political inequality measure: standard deviation of the relative representation of the five larger ethnic groups (Akan, Krou, Southern Mandé, Northern Mandé and Voltaic).

Genocide

- UN Convention on Genocide (1948):
 - “Acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group”

Genocide in Rwanda

- April-June 1994
– 100 days
- 500-800,000 dead
- Hutu and Tutsi



Popular explanations of the genocide in Rwanda

TIME

Monday, Apr. 18, 1994

Descent into Mayhem

By MARGUERITE MICHAELS; Clive Mutiso/Nairobi and Mark Thompson/Washington

Alarming as they were, the first, unconfirmed reports turned out to be understated. "We are lying prone on the floor," Christian Georgette, an aid worker for Oxfam, managed to phone back to the British aid group's headquarters on Thursday. "Every window in the house has been shattered by shrapnel and machine-gun fire, and soldiers are attacking the house next door with grenades. The fighting is really bad." Only later, however, would the full carnage of the latest ethnic violence in Rwanda be confirmed: the streets littered with corpses; the thousands killed in less than three days; the murder of 10 Belgian peacekeepers and groups of Catholic priests. And it would be Saturday before the French air force could land at Rwanda's Kigali airport and most of the country's 255 Americans could be reported as close to joining 330 Marines in the relative safety of neighboring Burundi.

In the two small Central African nations of Rwanda and Burundi, where politics is still dominated by the ancient rivalry between the predominant Hutu and minority Tutsi tribes, pure tribal enmity was behind the bloodshed. Last week's violence exploded after a plane carrying Presidents Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, both Hutus, crashed Wednesday night on the approach to Kigali airport, killing both leaders. Witnesses reported hearing heavy weapons fire moments before the plane went down. "What happened was not an accident but an assassination," said Jean Damascene Bizimana, Rwanda's ambassador to the U.N. The two leaders were returning from a conference in Tanzania. Its topic: the ending of decades of Hutu-Tutsi savagery.

The path to the genocide in Rwanda

- Precolonial Tutsi monarchy and the legacy of statehood
- Colonialism and the Hamitic hypothesis
- Hutu political mobilization in the 1950s
- Hutu Revolution in 1961
- Independence in 1962




The path to the genocide in Rwanda

- Tutsi displacement in the 1970s
- RPF invasion in 1990
- 1994 assassination
- Interahamwe




Causes of the genocide in Rwanda

- Straus:
 - Underlying conditions:
 - Power (and security) vacuum + political competition
 - Strong state
 - Easily mobilizable ethnic cleavage +
 - Tipping point →
 - Genocide
 - Straus, Scott. 2008. *The order of genocide: race, power, and war in Rwanda*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.



Variation



Recent trends according to Straus

- Decline in the frequency and intensity of political violence in Africa since the 1990s




Figure 1. Armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa by type, 1960–2008.




Figure 4. Battle deaths in civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa, 1960–2008.

Recent trends according to Straus

- Contemporary conflicts:
 - Typically small-scale
 - Fought on state peripheries and sometimes across multiple states
 - Involve factionalized insurgents typically unable to hold significant territory or capture state capitals
 - Increased electoral violence and violence over access to livelihood resources




Figure 5. Electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2008.




Figure 6. Violence over access to livelihood resources in sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2009.