

POLS 329 A
Comparative African Politics

Classes 11 and 12:

Authoritarianism, neopatrimonialism, and state-society relations

Recap: accounts of African statehood


- Hegemonic vs. non-hegemonic states
- Uniform vs. uneven (bifurcation, continuum) projection of state power
- Juridical vs. empirical statehood
- Emphasis on historical continuity vs. transformative effect of colonization

State-society relations: state incorporation

- Ensminger:
 - Societal demand for incorporation
 - Why?


Public service provision in Africa: evidence from Kenya

Figure 5: Road Investments and Presidential Ethnic Groups (1963-2011).



What explains this variation?

Figure 5: Road Investments and Presidential Ethnic Groups (1963-2011).




Regimes and regime change in post-independence Africa

- Initial democratic experiments
- Political instability:
 - Coups d'état
 - Military rule
- Authoritarianization and one-party rule




Authoritarian rule in Africa: the case of Kenya

- Independence and consolidation of power by Jomo Kenyatta, replaced by Daniel arap Moi in 1978
- One-party rule 1982-1991
- Pressure from civil society → *gradual democratization with multiparty elections in 1992*



What explains this variation?

Figure 5: Road Investments and Presidential Ethnic Groups (1963-2011).



Clientelism according to Fukuyama



<https://youtu.be/GLMXSWobiHM>

State and society according to Fukuyama

- Modern states require impersonal institutions
- However, the natural form of social relationships is patrimonialism:
 - “The natural human propensity to favor family and friends”

- Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The origins of political order: from prehuman times to the French Revolution*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Patrimonial states

- Weber:

- “We shall speak of a *patrimonial state* when the prince organizes his political power over extra-patrimonial areas and political subjects— which is not discretionary and not enforced by physical coercion— just like the exercise of his patriarchal power. The majority of all great continental empires had a fairly strong patrimonial character until and even after the beginning of modern times.”

- Weber, Max. 1968. *Economy and Society*. New York: Bedminster Press.

- Fukuyama:

- “Governments staffed by the family and friends of the ruler, and run for their benefit”
(In contrast, ‘modern governments’ are “staffed by officials chosen on the basis of merit and expertise, and run for the sake of a broad public interest”)

- Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Patrimonialism in the contemporary world

- “Today, not even the most corrupt dictators would argue, like some early kings or sultans, that they literally “owned” their countries and could do with them what they liked. Everyone pays lip service to the distinction between public and private interest. Hence patrimonialism has evolved into what is called ‘*neopatrimonialism*.’”


- Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Neopatrimonial states

- Outward form of a modern state:
 - Constitution
 - Office holders
 - Legal system
 - Pretensions of impersonality
- Actual operation of the government centered on sharing state resources with friends and family
 - Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.


Neopatrimonialism across the world

Figure 1: Global Trends in Neopatrimonialism Index



Neopatrimonialism in Africa

- Bratton and Van de Walle:
 - Neopatrimonialism as “the core feature of politics in Africa”
 - Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas Van de Walle. 1997. “Neopatrimonial Rule” in *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, pp. 61-96.





What are the characteristics of African neopatrimonialism according to Bratton and Van de Walle?

Characteristics of African neopatrimonialism

- Presidentialism
- Appropriation and use of state resources to cultivate political support and systematic clientelism
 - Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas Van de Walle. 1997. "Neopatrimonial Rule" in *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, pp. 61-96.
- Low state capacity
 - Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- State autonomy
- Weak civil society
- Hybridity
 - Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Presidentialism

- Big Man politics
- Personalization of loyalty to the state / nation
- Cult of personality
- Centralization of political power
 - Presidential political systems
- Lack of checks and balances
- Lack of term limits



Clientelism

- Appropriation of public resources and distribution of offices and favors to supporters
- Corruption
- Patron-client relationships

Clientelism

Table 2.7. *African Government Cabinet Size, 1979–1996*

	1979	1986	1996
Average Number of Members	19.1	20.9	22.6
– excluding microstates*	20.3	22.0	23.9
Smallest Cabinets*	Ghana (11) Gambia (11)	Namibia (8) Gambia (13)	Gambia (13) Lesotho (13)
Largest Cabinets	Gabon (35) Côte d’Ivoire (31)	Gabon (54) Cameroon (34)	Cameroon (42) Sudan (38)

Sources:


Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Independent: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ghana-president-nana-akufo-addo-appointment-110-ministers-government-a7636921.html>

News > World > Africa

Ghana's President defends appointing 'elephant-size' government of 110 ministers

Nana Akufo-Addo hit back at his opponents saying it is 'a necessary investment' and that 'it is not going to be a holiday' for ministers

Chloe Farand | Saturday 18 March 2017 15:27 GMT | 

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The Independent Online



Clientelism: evidence from Benin

- Random assignment of villages to clientelist and public policy platforms (+ control group) before 2001 presidential election in Benin
- [T]he first ever nationwide experimental study of voter behavior involving *real candidates* using experimental platforms.”

- Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin.” *World Politics* 55: 399–422.



What does Wantchekon find?

Clientelism: evidence from Benin


TABLE 3
DIFFERENCE IN MEANS BETWEEN TREATMENT AND CONTROL
VILLAGES FOR EACH TYPE OF CANDIDATE^a

<i>Type of Candidate^b</i>	<i>Public</i>	<i>Clientelist</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Public- Control</i>	<i>Clientelist- Control</i>
Northern	.322 (.032) 208	.674 (.032) 218	.565 (.035) 200	-.243 (.048)***	.109 (.047)**
Southern	.840 (.025) 219	.890 (.021) 228	.741 (.029) 224	.099 (.039)***	.149 (.036)***
Incumbent	.693 (.032) 202	.897 (.021) 214	.835 (.027) 194	-.141 (.042)***	.062 (.033)*
Opposition	.493 (.033) 225	.681 (.033) 232	.509 (.031) 230	-.015 (.047)	.172 (.045)***
Local	.385 (.032) 226	.603 (.033) 224	.509 (.033) 230	-.124 (.046)***	.094 (.047)**
National	.816 (.027) 201	.968 (.012) 222	.835 (.027) 194	-.019 (.038)	.133 (.028)***

Clientelism: corruption

Corruption Perception Index, 2015

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. Scores are on a scale of 0-100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt.



Source: Transparency International - CPI

OurWorldInData.org/corruption/ • CC BY-SA

Weak state capacity



Hybridity

- Coexistence of informal institutions with the formal trappings of the modern state
- Bratton and Van de Walle:
 - “[W]hen patrimonial logic is internalized in the formal institutions of neopatrimonial regimes, it provides essential operating codes for politics that are valued, recurring, and reproduced over time.”


State autonomy and weak civil society



What explains rulers' reliance on neopatrimonialism?

Benefits of neopatrimonialism according to Arriola

Figure 2
Mean Estimated Hazard Rate and Cabinet Size



Benefits of neopatrimonialism according to Arriola

Table 1
Regression Analysis of Cabinet Size

Variable	1	2	3	4
Polity	-0.686*** (0.145)			-0.530*** (0.108)
Log (GDP per capita) _{t-1}	4.554*** (0.802)	4.840*** (0.772)	3.949*** (1.220)	3.519*** (0.577)
Aid per capita _{t-1}	-0.010 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.024)	0.031 (0.029)	
Oil exporter	-3.704* (1.913)	-3.974* (1.814)	-2.343 (2.818)	
Mineral exporter	-1.136 (1.179)	-1.244 (1.134)	-1.062 (1.481)	
Ethnic fractionalization	5.588** (2.720)	5.613** (2.579)	6.253* (3.595)	4.837* (2.560)
French colony	-0.110 (1.003)	-0.475 (0.970)	0.607 (1.252)	
Log (population) _{t-1}	2.129*** (0.633)	2.309*** (0.596)	2.889*** (0.765)	2.240*** (0.379)
1980s indicator	8.189 (7.849)	8.082 (7.415)	5.217 (9.920)	
1990s indicator	3.736 (5.067)	1.262 (4.677)	0.049 (6.336)	
Full democracy		-11.329*** (2.106)		
Partial democracy		-6.063** (2.446)		
Executive: Multiparty			-6.764** (3.043)	
Executive: Nonelected			-0.007 (2.409)	
Constant	-48.474*** (12.472)	-47.792*** (11.862)	-51.960*** (16.544)	-39.714*** (7.521)
R ²	.744	.777	.614	.703


Note: Standard errors in parentheses. GDP = gross domestic product. $N = 893$ observations. $n = 40$ countries.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.

What is Arriola's explanation of his finding?

Intra-African variation

Figure 5: Neopatrimonialism Index 2015 Scores



What explains this variation?

Varieties of neopatrimonialism according to Bratton and Van de Walle




Figure 5 Modal Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, Independence to 1989

Varieties of neopatrimonialism according to Bratton and Van de Walle



Table 3. *Modal Regimes by Country, Sub-Saharan Africa, 1989*

Plebiscitary One-Party Systems (n = 16)	Military Oligarchies (n = 11)	Competitive One-Party Systems (n = 13)	Settler Oligarchies (n = 2)	Multiparty Systems (n = 5)
Angola	Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Namibia	Botswana
Bénin	Burundi	Central African Republic	South Africa	Gambia
Cape Verde	Chad	Côte d'Ivoire		Mauritius
Comoros	Ghana	Madagascar		Sénégal
Congo	Guinea	Mali		Zimbabwe
Djibouti	Lesotho	Malawi		
Equatorial Guinea	Liberia	Rwanda		
Ethiopia	Mauritania	São Tomé		
Gabon	Nigeria	Seychelles		
Guinea-Bissau	Sudan	Sierra Leone		
Kenya	Uganda	Tanzania		
Mozambique		Togo		
Niger		Zambia		
Somalia				
Swaziland				
Zaire				

Consequences of neopatrimonialism

- “The struggle for power was so absorbing that everything else, including development, was marginalized.”


- Ake, Claude. 1996. *Democracy and Development in Africa*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.



Consequences of neopatrimonialism

Incidence of bribe requests, private sector, 2013

Percent of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment request during 6 transactions dealing with utilities access, permits, licences, and taxes.



Source: World Bank – Enterprise Survey


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Consequences of neopatrimonialism

Human Development Index vs. Corruption Perception Index



The vertical axis shows scores in the UN Human Development index (2013 data, lower values reflect lower development). The horizontal axis shows scores in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (2013 data, lower values reflect higher perceived corruption). Colors reflect world regions.



Source: Transparency International - CPI, United Nations Human Development Index (HDI)

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
Consequences of neopatrimonialism

Table A.2. *Africa's Share of Global Economic Activity, 1980–1996 (as a percentage of world total)*


	1980	1996
Population	8.6	10.3
GDP	2.5	1.1
Value added, Manufacturing	1.4	0.9
Merchandise Exports	3.8	1.3
Foreign Direct Investment	0.3	0.6

Source: Calculated from World Bank, *World Development Indicators, 1998* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998), Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 6.8. Additional data from the World Bank, *African Development Indicators* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997), Table 5.1.

Consequences of neopatrimonialism



Consequences of neopatrimonialism



Is neopatrimonialism
the real cause of Africa's ills,
or are the observed relationships
spurious?

Kahoot!