

# POLS 280: Politics of Development and Foreign Aid

Class 21:

The politics of collective identities and its developmental effects

# Recap

- Developmental outcomes of different configurations of state-society relations:
  - Integrated → state autonomy →
    - High state capacity → development (or, in some cases, unsuccessful 'seeing like a state' schemes) + repression
    - (Neo)patrimonialism → low state capacity → low level of development + repression
  - Dispersed →
    - 'Triangle of accommodation' → low state capacity → low level of development + (in some cases) decentralization of predation (i.e. emergence of roving bandits)
    - 'Consensually strong state equilibrium' (Acemoglu 2005)

# Recap

	<b>Integrated (autonomous)</b>	<b>Dispersed</b>
<b>High state capacity</b>	Development + repression	Development + accountability / responsiveness (‘consensually strong state equilibrium’)
<b>Low state capacity</b>	No development + repression	No development + decentralization of predation

# Plan for today

- Pitfalls of sociability
- Politics of collective identities, esp. ethnicity

# Pitfalls of sociability according to Fukuyama

- Basic building blocks of human sociability:
  - Kin selection
  - Reciprocal altruism
    - Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The Origins of Political Order*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

What are the effects of kin selection and reciprocal altruism?

# The effects of human sociability according to Fukuyama

- “The natural human propensity to favor family and friends,”  
a.k.a. patrimonialism

Why aren't all countries  
(neo)patrimonial?



# Pitfalls of sociability according to Habyarimana et al.

- Coin game:
  - Player receives two UGX 100 or 500 coins and is asked to allocate the coins among themselves and two partners
  - Two versions, with different results:
    - Offerer anonymous: equal allocation to co-ethnics and non-co-ethnics
    - Offerer visible: significantly larger allocation to co-ethnics than to non-co-ethnics
- Interpretation:
  - Enforcement of cooperation-facilitating norms by ethnic groups →
  - Sanctioning of community members who fail to contribute to collective endeavors
    - Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101 (4): 709–25.

# Pitfalls of sociability according to Habyarimana et al. (and Fukuyama)

- Implications:
  - Coethnics = kin
  - Particular difficulty of depatrimonialization (necessary for the establishment of 'modern states') in ethnically diverse societies

# Ethnic diversity and public goods provision according to Habyarimana et al.


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- Interpretation:
  - Enforcement of cooperation-facilitating norms by ethnic groups →
  - Sanctioning of community members who fail to contribute to collective endeavors →
  - **Ethnic diversity impedes the provision of public goods**
    - Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101 (4): 709–25.

# Correlates of ethnic fractionalization

- Positive:
  - Conflict
- Negative:
  - Economic growth
  - Government public goods provision
  - Societal trust
  - Civil peace

# Ethnic fractionalization and economic growth according to Alesina et al.

## Ethnic Fractionalization vs GDP Per Capita



Source: Alesina et. al (2003)

# Ethnic fractionalization and economic growth according to Easterly and Levine



- 28 percent of the economic growth differential between the countries of Africa and East Asia explained by ethnic diversity

- Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (4): 1203-50.



Is the effect of ethnic diversity  
deterministic according to  
Miguel?

# Ethnic diversity and public goods provision according to Miguel






Why does ethnic diversity  
impede the provision of public  
goods according to Miguel?

# Ethnic diversity and public goods provision according to Miguel

- Natural experiment
- Political salience of ethnicity:
  - Low in Tanzania
  - High in Kenya
    - Edward Miguel, "Tribe or Nation?: Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania," *World Politics* 56, no. 3 (2004): 327–62.



# Political salience of ethnicity in Kenya and Tanzania

- Tanzania:
  - Julius Nyerere, Zanaki
  - Equitable distribution of government resources
  - Nation-building
- Kenya:
  - Jomo Kenyatta, Kikuyu
  - Ethnic favoritism
  - Political mobilization of coethnic ties



# Political salience of ethnicity in Kenya



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CynQ3Z30pP4>

What mechanisms mediate the relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods provision according to Habyarimana et al. and Miguel?

# Mechanisms

- Habyarimana et al.: enforcement of cooperation-facilitating norms by ethnic groups
- Miguel: political salience of ethnicity
- Implications:
  - No direct, deterministic relationship between ethnicity and public goods provision

# Collective identities

- Ethnic
- Gender
- Linguistic
- National
- Racial
- Religious

Are the developmental effects  
of other collective identities  
the same as those of ethnicity?



# Takeaways

- Socially detrimental effects of ethnicity (and potentially other collective identities) on development
- Key role of causal mechanisms