

# POLC42

## Topics in Comparative Politics

### African Politics

Week 7: Neopatrimonialism and state-society relations in Africa

# Announcements

- Final exam: 10<sup>th</sup> August, 9-11 am, in MW 160
- Term tests
- TA: Michael Braun
- Make-up term test: today, 5.10-7 pm, in HL 502
- Research proposals due at midnight, 1% late penalty per weekday (0.1% of the course grade)
- Informal feedback survey results

# How to read Political Science scholarship

- The importance and difficulty of sources and sentences vary
- Figure out what's really important:
  - Key question(s)
  - Main argument
  - Research design
  - Most important empirical data

# How to read Political Science scholarship

- Think critically:
  - What are the author's assumptions? Are they problematic?
  - Is the argument internally consistent?
  - How does it differ from other scholars' claims
  - What evidence is missing?

# How to read Political Science scholarship

**Table 1**  
**Regression Analysis of Cabinet Size**

Variable	1	2	3	4
Polity	-0.686*** (0.145)			-0.530*** (0.108)
Log (GDP per capita) <sub>t-1</sub>	4.554*** (0.802)	4.840*** (0.772)	3.949*** (1.220)	3.519*** (0.577)
Aid per capita <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.010 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.024)	0.031 (0.029)	
Oil exporter	-3.704* (1.913)	-3.974** (1.814)	-2.343 (2.818)	
Mineral exporter	-1.136 (1.179)	-1.244 (1.134)	-1.062 (1.481)	
Ethnic fractionalization	5.588** (2.720)	5.613** (2.579)	6.253* (3.595)	4.837* (2.560)
French colony	-0.110 (1.003)	-0.475 (0.970)	0.607 (1.252)	
Log (population) <sub>t-1</sub>	2.129*** (0.633)	2.309*** (0.596)	2.889*** (0.765)	2.240*** (0.379)
1980s indicator	8.189 (7.849)	8.082 (7.415)	5.217 (9.920)	
1990s indicator	3.736 (5.067)	1.262 (4.677)	0.049 (6.336)	
Full democracy		-11.329*** (2.106)		
Partial democracy		-6.063** (2.446)		
Executive: Multiparty			-6.764** (3.043)	
Executive: Nonelected			-0.007 (2.409)	
Constant	-48.474*** (12.472)	-47.792*** (11.862)	-51.960*** (16.544)	-39.714*** (7.521)
R <sup>2</sup>	.744	.777	.614	.703

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. GDP = gross domestic product.  $N = 893$  observations.  $n = 40$  countries.

\*  $p < .10$ . \*\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*\*  $p < .01$ .

Leonardo R. Arriola. 2009. "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (10): 1339–62.

# How to read Political Science scholarship

**TABLE 2. Migrant Diversity, Organizations for Public Goods Provision, and Fiscal Capacity**

	Volunteer fire brigades		Municipal guard		Property tax rate		ln(Property tax revenue)	
	OLS		Logistic		OLS		OLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	
Migrant diversity	-4.03** (1.48)	2.50* (1.23)		3.62 (4.91)		0.67** (0.22)		
Share migrants	-1.14 (1.06)	2.05* (0.84)		-6.85+ (3.55)		0.03 (0.16)		
Volunteer fire brigades			-0.09* (0.04)		-0.36** (0.14)		-0.01* (0.01)	
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
District fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
<i>N</i>	611	611	611	607	607	607	607	
Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.24			0.15	0.15	0.23	0.23	
Log likelihood		-239.19	-241.46					
AIC		518.39	520.92					

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

# Recap

- Historical legacies:
  - Degrees of precolonial centralization
  - Colonial exploitation and administrative variation
  - Early postcolonial state-making
- Key issues in contemporary African politics:
  - Africa's states-system
  - African postcolonial states →
- State-society relations in Africa


# State-society relations: state incorporation

- Ensminger:
  - Societal demand for incorporation
  - Why?




# Public service provision in Africa: evidence from Kenya

Figure 5: Road Investments and Presidential Ethnic Groups (1963-2011).



# What explains this variation?

Figure 5: Road Investments and Presidential Ethnic Groups (1963-2011).



# Clientelism according to Fukuyama



<https://youtu.be/GLMXSWobiHM>

# State and society according to Fukuyama

- Modern states require impersonal institutions
- However, the natural form of social relationships is patrimonialism:
  - “The natural human propensity to favor family and friends”
    - Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The origins of political order: from prehuman times to the French Revolution*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

# Patrimonial states

- Weber:

- “We shall speak of a *patrimonial state* when the prince organizes his political power over extra-patrimonial areas and political subjects—which is not discretionary and not enforced by physical coercion—just like the exercise of his patriarchal power. The majority of all great continental empires had a fairly strong patrimonial character until and even after the beginning of modern times.”

- Weber, Max. 1968. *Economy and Society*. New York: Bedminster Press.

- Fukuyama:

- “Governments staffed by the family and friends of the ruler, and run for their benefit”

(In contrast, ‘modern governments’ are “staffed by officials chosen on the basis of merit and expertise, and run for the sake of a broad public interest”)

- Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

# Patrimonialism in the contemporary world

- “Today, not even the most corrupt dictators would argue, like some early kings or sultans, that they literally “owned” their countries and could do with them what they liked. Everyone pays lip service to the distinction between public and private interest. Hence patrimonialism has evolved into what is called ‘*neopatrimonialism*.’”


- Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

# Neopatrimonial states

- Outward form of a modern state:
  - Constitution
  - Office holders
  - Legal system
  - Pretensions of impersonality
- Actual operation of the government centred on sharing state resources with friends and family
  - Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

# Neopatrimonialism across the world

Figure 1: Global Trends in Neopatrimonialism Index





# Neopatrimonialism in Africa



- Bratton and Van de Walle:
  - Neopatrimonialism as “the core feature of politics in Africa”
    - Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas Van de Walle. 1997. “Neopatrimonial Rule” in *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, pp. 61-96.

# Characteristics of African neopatrimonialism

- Presidentialism
- Appropriation and use of state resources to cultivate political support and systematic clientelism
  - Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas Van de Walle. 1997. "Neopatrimonial Rule" in *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, pp. 61-96.
- Low state capacity
  - Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- State autonomy
- Weak civil society
- Hybridity
  - Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

# Presidentialism

- Big Man politics
- Personalization of loyalty to the state / nation
- Cult of personality
- Centralization of political power
  - Presidential political systems
- Lack of checks and balances
- Lack of term limits



# Clientelism

- Appropriation of public resources and distribution of offices and favours to supporters
- Corruption
- Patron-client relationships
- Prebendalism: “state offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by officeholders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups”
  - Joseph, Richard. 1996. "Nigeria: Inside the Dismal Tunnel." *Current History*, May.

# Clientelism

Table 2.7. *African Government Cabinet Size, 1979–1996*

	1979	1986	1996
Average Number of Members	19.1	20.9	22.6
– excluding microstates*	20.3	22.0	23.9
Smallest Cabinets*	Ghana (11) Gambia (11)	Namibia (8) Gambia (13)	Gambia (13) Lesotho (13)
Largest Cabinets	Gabon (35) Côte d'Ivoire (31)	Gabon (54) Cameroon (34)	Cameroon (42) Sudan (38)

Sources:


Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

*The Independent*: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ghana-president-nana-akufo-addo-appointment-110-ministers-government-a7636921.html>

News > World > Africa

## Ghana's President defends appointing 'elephant-size' government of 110 ministers

Nana Akufo-Addo hit back at his opponents saying it is 'a necessary investment' and that 'it is not going to be a holiday' for ministers

Chloe Farand | Saturday 18 March 2017 15:27 GMT | 

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The Independent Online



# Clientelism: evidence from Benin

- Wantchekon:
  - Random assignment of villages to clientelist and public policy platforms (+ control group) before 2001 presidential election in Benin
  - [T]he first ever nationwide experimental study of voter behavior involving *real candidates* using experimental platforms.”
  - What are the findings?
    - Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin.” *World Politics* 55: 399–422.

Kahoot!

# Clientelism: evidence from Benin

TABLE 3  
DIFFERENCE IN MEANS BETWEEN TREATMENT AND CONTROL  
VILLAGES FOR EACH TYPE OF CANDIDATE<sup>a</sup>


<i>Type of Candidate<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Public</i>	<i>Clientelist</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Public- Control</i>	<i>Clientelist- Control</i>
Northern	.322 (.032) 208	.674 (.032) 218	.565 (.035) 200	-.243 (.048)***	.109 (.047)**
Southern	.840 (.025) 219	.890 (.021) 228	.741 (.029) 224	.099 (.039)***	.149 (.036)***
Incumbent	.693 (.032) 202	.897 (.021) 214	.835 (.027) 194	-.141 (.042)***	.062 (.033)*
Opposition	.493 (.033) 225	.681 (.033) 232	.509 (.031) 230	-.015 (.047)	.172 (.045)***
Local	.385 (.032) 226	.603 (.033) 224	.509 (.033) 230	-.124 (.046)***	.094 (.047)**
National	.816 (.027) 201	.968 (.012) 222	.835 (.027) 194	-.019 (.038)	.133 (.028)***



# Clientelism: corruption

## Corruption Perception Index, 2015

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. Scores are on a scale of 0-100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt.



Source: Transparency International - CPI

OurWorldInData.org/corruption/ • CC BY-SA

# Weak state capacity

- Low ability to extract taxes
- Lack of monopoly of force over state territory
- Few bureaucracies

# Hybridity

- Coexistence of informal institutions with the formal trappings of the modern state
- Bratton and Van de Walle:
  - “[W]hen patrimonial logic is internalized in the formal institutions of neopatrimonial regimes, it provides essential operating codes for politics that are valued, recurring, and reproduced over time.”

# State autonomy and weak civil society

- Contra Migdal, Kohli, and Shue:
  - State as an arena, rather than autonomous agent or instrument of rulers
    - Migdal, Joel S., Atul Kohli, Vivienne Shue. 1994. *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Forms of societal pushback against the state:
  - Hirschman:
    - Exit
    - Loyalty
    - Voice
      - Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

What explains rulers' reliance on neopatrimonialism?


# Benefits of neopatrimonialism

- Arriola:
  - Cabinet expansion lowers the probability of a leader's being deposed through a coup
    - Arriola, Leonardo. 2009. "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa," *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(10): 1339-1359.
- Why?

Kahoot!

# Intra-African variation

Figure 5: Neopatrimonialism Index 2015 Scores





What explains this variation?

# Varieties of neopatrimonialism according to Bratton and Van de Walle




Figure 5 Modal Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, Independence to 1989

# Varieties of neopatrimonialism according to Bratton and Van de Walle

Table 3. *Modal Regimes by Country, Sub-Saharan Africa, 1989*

Plebiscitary One-Party Systems (n = 16)	Military Oligarchies (n = 11)	Competitive One-Party Systems (n = 13)	Settler Oligarchies (n = 2)	Multiparty Systems (n = 5)
Angola	Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Namibia	Botswana
Bénin	Burundi	Central African Republic	South Africa	Gambia
Cape Verde	Chad	Côte d'Ivoire		Mauritius
Comoros	Ghana	Madagascar		Sénégal
Congo	Guinea	Mali		Zimbabwe
Djibouti	Lesotho	Malawi		
Equatorial Guinea	Liberia	Rwanda		
Ethiopia	Mauritania	São Tomé		
Gabon	Nigeria	Seychelles		
Guinea-Bissau	Sudan	Sierra Leone		
Kenya	Uganda	Tanzania		
Mozambique		Togo		
Niger		Zambia		
Somalia				
Swaziland				
Zaire				


# Consequences of neopatrimonialism

- “The struggle for power was so absorbing that everything else, including development, was marginalized.”
  - Ake, Claude. 1996. *Democracy and Development in Africa*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

# Consequences of neopatrimonialism

## Incidence of bribe requests, private sector, 2013

Percent of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment request during 6 transactions dealing with utilities access, permits, licences, and taxes.



Source: World Bank – Enterprise Survey


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# Consequences of neopatrimonialism

## Human Development Index vs. Corruption Perception Index



The vertical axis shows scores in the UN Human Development index (2013 data, lower values reflect lower development). The horizontal axis shows scores in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (2013 data, lower values reflect higher perceived corruption). Colors reflect world regions.



Source: Transparency International - CPI, United Nations Human Development Index (HDI)

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
# Consequences of neopatrimonialism

Table A.2. *Africa's Share of Global Economic Activity, 1980-1996 (as a percentage of world total)*

	1980	1996
Population	8.6	10.3
GDP	2.5	1.1
Value added, Manufacturing	1.4	0.9
Merchandise Exports	3.8	1.3
Foreign Direct Investment	0.3	0.6

*Source:* Calculated from World Bank, *World Development Indicators, 1998* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998), Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 6.8. Additional data from the World Bank, *African Development Indicators* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997), Table 5.1.

# Consequences of neopatrimonialism





# Consequences of neopatrimonialism



Is neopatrimonialism  
the real cause of Africa's ills,  
or are the observed relationships spurious?