

POL201Y1: Politics of Development

Lecture 9:

Anarchy and the emergence of political order

Recap

- Explanations of development (and lack thereof):
 - Modernization
 - Neoliberalism
 - Dependency / underdevelopment and world-systems
 - Geography
 - History
 - Institutionalism

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 - Modernization
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 - *Geography*
 - *History*
 - Institutionalism

Why do institutions matter?

- Functions of institutions:
 - Reduction of costs of political and economic bargaining
 - Constraints on power
 - Foundation of (political) order

Why does order matter?

- Dispute resolution
- Protection from violence
- Reduction of uncertainty
- Tragedy of the commons (Garrett Hardin)

Institutions vs. political order

Order-making

- Cooperation
- But:
 - Commitment problems
 - Information asymmetries
 - → Lack of trust

Providers of order

- Brokering trust
- Enforcement of property rights and contracts
- Adjudication of disputes
- Reduction of transaction risks and costs
- Reduction of externalities
- Defense
- Provision of other public goods

Providers of order

- Private:
 - Organized crime = stationary bandits
- Political organizations:
 - Bands
 - Tribes / ethnic groups
 - Chiefdoms
 - States

How does order emerge?

Initial condition: anarchy

- Hereby it is manifest that, during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of **every man against every man**.

[...]

In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no culture of the earth, no navigation nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and, which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and **the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short**.

- Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. *Of Man, Being the First Part of Leviathan*. Chapter XII.

Emergence of political order according to Olson

- Small-scale societies: voluntary agreement sufficient to enforce order
- Larger societies: freeriding →
- Anarchy:
 - Uncoordinated competitive theft by 'roving bandits' →
 - Destruction of incentives to invest and produce →
 - Little benefit to either the population or the bandits
- Both the population and a bandit can be better off if the bandit sets herself up as a dictator, or a 'stationary bandit'
- The stationary bandit monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes
 - Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *American Political Science Review* 87 (3): 567–76.

Emergence of political order according to Fukuyama

- Human beings as rational, self-interested creatures
- Prisoner's dilemma
- Repeated prisoner's dilemma:
 - Tit-for-tat (player reciprocates cooperation if the other player cooperated in an earlier game but refuses to cooperate with a player who failed to cooperate previously) as the winning strategy (Robert Axelrod) →
- Self-interest compels cooperation
- Humans as social beings
- Human sociability is built on two principles:
 - Kin selection: human beings act altruistically toward genetic relatives (or individuals believed to be genetic relatives)
 - Reciprocal altruism: human beings tend to develop relationships of mutual benefit or mutual harm as they interact with other individuals over time

		Prisoner A	
		Silent	Betray
Prisoner B	Silent	-1, -1	0, -3
	Betray	0, -3	-2, -2

Evolution of political order according to Fukuyama = political development

- Kin-based, relatively egalitarian:
 - Bands
 - Tribes
- Chiefdoms
- States:
 - Centralized source of authority=sovereign
 - Monopoly of the legitimate means of coercion
 - Territorial authority
 - Stratification and inequality
 - Legitimation by elaborate forms of religious belief


Evolution of political order according to Fukuyama

- Evolution of political order made possible by:
 - Natural human sociability
 - Innate human propensity for creating and following norms or rules
 - Human need for recognition
 - → Religious belief—source of social cohesion
 - Natural human propensity for violence

Political order in kin-based societies

- Wide variety of governance structures, based on principles such as common descent (lineage and clans), place of residence, moiety, and age-ranking (age-set and generation-set systems, age grades)
- Benefits:
 - Low cost
 - Often effective at mediating the internal competition and responding to external pressures

Political order in kin-based societies: case of East African drylands



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Political order in kin-based societies: case of East African drylands

- Nilotic societies:
 - Eastern Nilotic:
 - Ateker: Dodoth, Jie, Jiye, Karimojong, Nyangatom, Toposa, and Turkana
 - [Maa-speaking groups: (Laikipiak) Maasai and Samburu]
 - Southern Nilotic: Pokot
 - Two basic units of social organization: age-sets and generation-sets
 - Gerontocratic governance systems



Political order in kin-based societies: case of East African drylands

- Cushitic societies: the Borana, Gabbra, Rendille, and Somali
- Borana:
 - *Gadaa* generation-class system
 - Hereditary high priests
 - Descent segments: moieties, clans, sub-clans, and lineages
 - Assemblies and councils



Political order in kin-based societies: case of East African drylands

- Outcomes:
 - Effective management of natural resources in a very challenging physical environment:
 - Open access regime, but no tragedy of the commons
 - Effective resolution of internal and, to an extent, external disputes
 - Provision of some other public goods, e.g. stock-associates
 - Relatively low cost

Causes of political development

- Bands → tribes:
 - Superior ability of tribal societies to mobilize manpower
- Kin-based societies → states

Causes of the emergence of states

- Social contract (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau)
 - Hobbes: through monopoly of force Leviathan guarantees each citizen basic security in return for restrictions on freedom, taxation, conscription etc.
 - However: social contract as the cause of transition from egalitarian kin-based societies to coercive, domineering, hierarchical states?

Causes of the emergence of states

- Hydraulic theory (Karl Wittfogel):
 - States emerged in Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, and Meso-America because of the need for large-scale irrigation, which could only be managed by a centralized bureaucratic state
 - However: large-scale irrigation projects mostly after states emerged

Causes of the emergence of states

- Population pressure (Ester Bogerup):
 - Dense populations around river systems in Egypt, Mesopotamia, China spawned intensive systems of agriculture involving large-scale irrigation, new higher-yielding crops, etc.
 - Population density permitted specialization and division of labour, leading to the rise of elites
 - Dense agricultural populations, unlike low-density tribal societies, cannot mitigate conflict by moving away →
 - Centralized form of political authority becomes necessary
 - However: agricultural production does not necessarily lead to surpluses; reverse causation?

Causes of the emergence of states

- Circumscription (Robert Carneiro):
 - Hierarchical states emerge when:
 - Increases in productivity take place within a geographically circumscribed area such as a river valley, or
 - Other hostile societies effectively circumscribe another society's territory
 - Why? Exit is impossible
 - However: stateless agricultural valley societies in New Guinea highlands

Causes of the emergence of states

- Fukuyama—confluence of factors:
 - Abundance of resources to permit the creation of surpluses above what is necessary for subsistence
 - Size of society sufficient to permit the emergence of a rudimentary division of labor and a ruling elite
 - Physical constraints to prevent exit and encourage increases in density
 - Incentives to give up freedom:
 - Threat of physical extinction by other, well-organized groups, or
 - Charismatic authority of a religious leader
 - Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The Origins of Political Order*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

Causes of the emergence of states

- War and violence