

# POL201Y1: Politics of Development

Lecture 16:

Identities and cleavages

# Recap

- Developmental outcomes of different configurations of state-society relations:
  - Dispersed / fragmented →
    - ‘Triangle of accommodation’ → low state capacity → low level of development + (in some cases) decentralization of predation (i.e. emergence of roving bandits)
    - ‘Consensually strong state equilibrium’ (Acemoglu 2005)
  - Integrated / concentrated → state autonomy →
    - High state capacity → development (or, in some cases, unsuccessful ‘seeing like a state’ schemes) + repression
    - (Neo)patrimonialism → low state capacity → low level of development + repression

# Recap

- State responses to social disaffection (EVL game):
  - ‘Consensually strong state equilibrium’ → state responsiveness
  - ‘Triangle of accommodation’ → ineffective state responsiveness
  - State autonomy → no state responsiveness
- Societal responses to the outcomes of EVL game:
  - ‘Consensually strong state equilibrium’ → satisfaction → acceptance
  - Other outcomes → dissatisfaction →
    - High cost of voice → acceptance
    - Reduction of the cost of voice → attempted regime change

# Recap

- Outcomes of attempts to effect regime change:
  - Failure
  - Civil war
  - Regime change
- Outcomes of regime change:
  - Consolidation
  - Inability to consolidate

# What accounts for the inability to consolidate new regimes?

# What accounts for the inability to consolidate new regimes?

- Dispersion / fragmentation of social control + lack of consensus with respect to the regime type

# Fragmentation of social control and lack of consensus between social forces

- Unsuccessful (or, at least, protracted) regime consolidation
- 'Regime deconsolidation,' i.e. political decay (Fukuyama)
- 'Triangle of accommodation'

# Explaining what social forces do



# Benefits of sociability (Fukuyama)

- Human beings as rational, self-interested creatures
- Repeated prisoner's dilemma:
  - Tit-for-tat (player reciprocates cooperation if the other player cooperated in an earlier game but refuses to cooperate with a player who failed to cooperate previously) as the winning strategy (Robert Axelrod) →
- Self-interest compels cooperation
  - Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The Origins of Political Order*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

# Benefits of sociability




Fig. 1 *Trust and Growth (partial plot)*

Zak, Paul J. and Stephen Knack. 2001. "Trust and Growth." *The Economic Journal* 111 (470): 295-321.


# How is cooperation and trust enforced?

- Providers of order
- Society:
  - ~~Social capital~~
  - Imposition of cost on free-riders

# Social enforcement of cooperation: experimental evidence

- Ultimatum game:
  - Player A receives  $X$
  - A chooses  $X \geq x \geq 0$  to give player B
  - B can:
    - Accept  $x \rightarrow$  A gets  $X - x$ ; B gets  $x$
    - Reject  $x \rightarrow$  A and B both get 0
  - Measure of fairness
  - What is the SPNE?

# Social enforcement of cooperation: experimental evidence



From Clark, W. R., M. Golder, and S. N. Golder. 2012. *Principles of Comparative Politics*. SAGE Publications.

# Social enforcement of cooperation: experimental evidence

Table 2. Descriptive statistics by country.

Country	N (1)	Mean offer (2)	Mean reject (3)	IDV (4)	PDI (5)	AUTH (6)	TRUST (7)	COMP (8)	GDP pc (9)	GINI index (10)
Austria	1	39.21	16.10	55	11	-0.05	0.32	6.78	12955	23.1
Bolivia	1	37.00	0.00						1721	42.0
Chile	1	34.00	6.70	23	63	1.10	0.23	5.94	4890	56.5
Ecuador	2	34.50	7.50	8	78				2830	46.6
France	3	40.24	30.78	71	68	-0.15	0.23	5.97	13918	32.7
Germany	1	36.70	9.52	67	35	-1.30	0.38	6.75	11666	30.0
Honduras	1	45.70	23.05						1385	53.7
Indonesia	4	46.63	14.63	14	78				2102	36.5
Israel	5	41.71	17.73	54	13				9843	35.5
Japan	3	44.73	19.27	46	54	-1.58	0.42	5.52	15105	24.9
Yugoslavia	1	44.33	26.67	27	76	-0.65	0.30	7.07	4548	31.9
Kenya	1	44.00	4.00	27	64				914	57.5
Mongolia	2	35.50	5.00						1842	33.2
Netherlands	2	42.25	9.24	80	38	-0.55	0.56	5.60	13281	31.5
Papua New-Guinea	2	40.50	33.50						1606	50.9
Paraguay	1	51.00	0.00						2178	59.1
Peru	1	26.00	4.80	16	64	1.75	0.05	6.54	2092	46.2
Romania	2	36.95	23.50				0.16	7.32	2043	28.2
Slovakia	3	43.17	12.67			-0.55	0.23	6.97	4095	19.5
Spain	1	26.66	29.17	51	57	0.60	0.34	5.70	9802	38.5
Sweden	1	35.23	18.18	71	31	-1.35	0.66	6.78	13986	25.0
Tanzania	4	37.50	19.25	27	64				534	38.2
UK	2	34.33	23.38	89	35	0.10	0.44	6.19	12724	32.6
US East	22	40.54	17.15	91	40	1.11	0.50	6.70	17945	40.1
US West	6	42.64	9.41	91	40	1.11	0.50	6.70	17945	40.1
Zimbabwe	2	43.00	8.50						1162	56.8

Note. IDV is country's score on Hofstede's (1991) individualism index; PDI is country's score on Hofstede's power distance index; AUTH is country's score on Inglehart's traditional/secular-rational dimension (higher values signify more respect for authority); TRUST is percentage in country's population saying that most people can be trusted (World Values Survey); COMP is country's score on 1-10 scale on statement that competition is good (World Values Survey). GDP per capita closest to 1990 (World Bank); Gini index is for income of households per capita for all areas and all populations closest year to 1990 (UNDP World income inequality data base).

Oosterbeek, Hessel, Randolph Sloof, and Gijs Van De Kuilen. 2004. "Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis." *Experimental Economics* 7 (2): 171-88.

# Everything is awesome?



# Pitfalls of sociability (Fukuyama)

- Basic building blocks of human sociability:
  - Kin selection
  - Reciprocal altruism
    - Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The Origins of Political Order*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.



# Pitfalls of sociability: experimental evidence (Habyarimana et al.)

- Coin game:
  - Player receives two UGX 100 or 500 coins and is asked to allocate the coins among themselves and two partners, with no one player (including the offerer) permitted to receive both coins
  - Two versions:
    - Offerer anonymous: equal allocation to co-ethnics and non-co-ethnics
    - Offerer visible: significantly larger allocation to co-ethnics than to non-co-ethnics
- Interpretation:
  - Ethnic groups enforce cooperation-facilitating norms that can be used to sanction community members who fail to contribute to collective endeavours
  - Ethnic diversity impedes the provision of public goods
    - Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101 (4): 709–25.

# Pitfalls of sociability: econometric evidence (Easterly and Levine)

- Cross-country differences in ethnic diversity explain a substantial part of the cross-country differences in public policies, political instability, and other economic factors associated with long-run growth
- Ethnic diversity alone accounts for about 28 percent of the growth differential between the countries of Africa and East Asia

- Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (4): 1203-50.



# Pitfalls of sociability: evidence from a natural experiment (Miguel)

- Two ethnically diverse research sites: Busia and Meatu
- Nearly identical in the 1960s
- Different policies after independence:
  - Nation-building in Tanzania
  - Ethnic politics in Kenya →
- Ethnic diversity associated with lower public goods funding in western Kenya, but not in western Tanzania
  - Miguel, Edward. 2004. "Tribe or Nation?: Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania." *World Politics* 56 (3): 327–62.




FIGURE 1  
MAP OF EAST AFRICA  
(FEATURING BUSIA DISTRICT, KENYA, AND MEATU DISTRICT, TANZANIA)

# Is ethnicity different from other social cleavages?

- Types of identities:
  - Class / income
  - Ethnicity
  - Location
  - Race
  - Religion
- Types of cleavages:
  - Owner vs. worker / rich vs. poor
  - Ethnic group A vs. ethnic group B
  - Centre vs. periphery / rural vs. urban
  - Race A vs. race B
  - Religion A vs. religion B
- Crosscutting / reinforcing cleavages

# What explains the deleterious effects of social cleavages?

- Habyarimana et al.: inability to enforce cooperation

- Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101 (4): 709–25.

- Easterly and Levine: "interest group polarization leads to rent-seeking behavior and reduces the consensus for public goods, creating long-run growth tragedies"

- Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (4): 1203-50.

- Miguel: rulers' power consolidation strategies

- Miguel, Edward. 2004. "Tribe or Nation?: Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania." *World Politics* 56 (3): 327–62.

What determines which identity / cleavage becomes politically salient?

# Politics of identity (Posner)

- Situationality and instrumentality of collective identities
  - Identity adoption as a deliberate decision intended to maximize payoff
  - Individuals choose their identity, but institutions shape these individual choices by setting parameters that determine the repertoire of identities available to individuals
  - “I argue that the cleavage that emerges as salient is the aggregation of all actors' individual decisions about the identity that will serve them best, and that these decisions are constrained, first, by the option set from which the actors are choosing, and, second, by the formal institutional rules that govern political competition, which make some identities more advantageous than others.”
  - Regime change in Zambia:
    - One-party rule: ethnic
    - Multiparty system: linguistic
- Posner, Daniel N. 2005. “Introduction: Institutions and Ethnic Politics.” In *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. New York, New York, United States: Cambridge University Press. 1-19.

# Politics of identity: case of Marsabit


- Historical fluidity of collective identities
- Hardening, ethnicization, and territorialization of identities since the colonial era





# Politics of identity: case of Marsabit

- Main ethnic and sub-ethnic identities:
  - Borana:
    - Moieties and clans
  - Gabbra:
    - Five phratries
  - Rendille:
    - Moieties and nine clans (+ the Ariaal)
  - Burji



# Politics of identity: case of Marsabit

- Pre-devolution politics:
  - District elections: ethnic identities dominate (Borana dominance → creation of ReGaBu)
  - Constituency elections:
    - Ethnically heterogeneous constituencies: ethnic identities dominate
    - Ethnically homogeneous constituencies: sub-ethnic identities dominate
- Post-devolution politics:
  - (Ethnically homogeneous) constituency elections: sub-ethnic identities dominate
  - County elections: necessity of ethnic alliance formation → ethnic identities dominate

# Politics of identity: case of Marsabit

- Salience of ethnic identities →
- Interethnic divisions and tensions →
- Politicians' use of interethnic tensions to build popular support →
- Interethnic conflict

The screenshot shows the Al Jazeera website interface. At the top, the Al Jazeera logo is on the left, and navigation links for News, Middle East, Documentaries, Shows, Investigations, Opinion, and More are on the right. Below the navigation, there's a 'Live' button and a search icon. The main content area features a news article with the following details:

- Category:** POLITICS
- Date:** 8 DECEMBER 2013
- Title:** Ethnic clashes in Kenya leave dozens dead
- Text:** *More than 30 people have been killed in ethnic clashes in the town of Moyale in the past week.*

On the left side of the article, there are social media sharing options: Read to me, Share, Tweet, Comment, and Print. On the right side, there is a 'TRENDING' section with five items:

- 1 Qatar-Gulf crisis: All the latest updates
- 2 Russia: A resurgent superpower?
- 3 Protest calls grow as Israel tightens grip on al-Aqsa
- 4 Radiohead in Israel: A fig leaf for apartheid
- 5 US hits Iran with new sanctions over missile programme

Below the trending section is a 'RELATED' section with two items:

- Kenya's Ticking Time Bomb
- Water found deep underground in

The main image of the article shows a soldier in camouflage gear holding a rifle, looking upwards in a wooded area.