


POL201Y1: Politics of Development

Lecture 13:


Neopatrimonialism and corruption

State weakness



Rice, Susan, and Stewart Patrick. 2008. "Index of State Weakness in the Developing World." Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Development



What is the connection between state weakness and low levels of development?

State weakness according to Fukuyama

- Modern states require impersonal institutions
- However, the natural form of social relationships is patrimonialism:
 - “The natural human propensity to favor family and friends”
 - Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The origins of political order: from prehuman times to the French Revolution*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Difficulty of depatrimonialization (and possibility of inside capture and repatrimonialization)
 - Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The origins of political order: from prehuman times to the French Revolution*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
 - Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Patrimonial states

- Weber:

- “We shall speak of a *patrimonial state* when the prince organizes his political power over extra-patrimonial areas and political subjects—which is not discretionary and not enforced by physical coercion—just like the exercise of his patriarchal power. The majority of all great continental empires had a fairly strong patrimonial character until and even after the beginning of modern times.”

- Weber, Max. 1968. *Economy and Society*. New York: Bedminster Press.

- Fukuyama:

- “Governments staffed by the family and friends of the ruler, and run for their benefit” (In contrast, ‘modern governments’ are “staffed by officials chosen on the basis of merit and expertise, and run for the sake of a broad public interest”)

- Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Patrimonial states

- Constructed using the basic building blocks of human sociability:
 - Kin selection
 - Reciprocal altruism
- Led by well-organized elites that build power through the management of patronage chains by which clients follow patrons in pursuit of individual rewards
- Conversion of informal patronage networks into more formally organized clientelistic hierarchies as the scale of the society increases
- Reinforced by ritual, religion, and ideas legitimating a particular form of elite rule
- Often highly stable
 - Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Patrimonialism and repatrimonialization

- “The natural human propensity to favor family and friends—something I refer to as patrimonialism—constantly reasserts itself in the absence of strong countervailing incentives.

Organized groups—most often the rich and powerful—entrench themselves over time and begin demanding privileges from the state.

Particularly when a prolonged period of peace and stability gives way to financial and/or military crisis, these entrenched patrimonial groups extend their sway, or else prevent the state from responding adequately.

- “Much of the history of institutional development [has] revolved around the effort of kin groups to reinsert themselves into politics—what I have labeled *repatrimonialization*.”

- Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The origins of political order: from prehuman times to the French Revolution*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Patrimonialism in the contemporary world

- “Today, not even the most corrupt dictators would argue, like some early kings or sultans, that they literally “owned” their countries and could do with them what they liked. Everyone pays lip service to the distinction between public and private interest. Hence patrimonialism has evolved into what is called ‘*neopatrimonialism*.’”
 - Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Neopatrimonial government


- Outward form of a modern state:
 - Constitution
 - Office holders
 - Legal system
 - Pretensions of impersonality
- Actual operation of the government centred on sharing state resources with friends and family
 - Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Characteristics of (African) neopatrimonialism

- Personalism
- Appropriation and use of state resources to cultivate political support and pervasive clientelism
- Low state capacity
 - Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: from the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- State autonomy
- Weak civil society
- Hybridity
 - Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Personalism

- Big Man politics
- Personalization of loyalty to the state / nation
- Cult of personality
- Centralization of political power
 - Presidential political systems
- Lack of checks and balances
- Lack of term limits



Clientelism

- Appropriation of public resources and distribution of offices and favours to supporters
- Corruption
- Patron-client relationships
- Prebendalism: “state offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by officeholders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups”
 - Joseph, Richard. 1996. "Nigeria: Inside the Dismal Tunnel." *Current History*, May.

Clientelism

Table 2.7. *African Government Cabinet Size, 1979–1996*

	1979	1986	1996
Average Number of Members	19.1	20.9	22.6
– excluding microstates*	20.3	22.0	23.9
Smallest Cabinets*	Ghana (11) Gambia (11)	Namibia (8) Gambia (13)	Gambia (13) Lesotho (13)
Largest Cabinets	Gabon (35) Côte d’Ivoire (31)	Gabon (54) Cameroon (34)	Cameroon (42) Sudan (38)

Sources:

Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Independent: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ghana-president-nana-akufo-addo-appointment-110-ministers-government-a7636921.html>

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Ghana's President defends appointing 'elephant-size' government of 110 ministers

Nana Akufo-Addo hit back at his opponents saying it is 'a necessary investment' and that 'it is not going to be a holiday' for ministers

Chloe Farand | Saturday 18 March 2017 15:27 GMT |

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



Clientelism: corruption

Corruption Perception Index, 2015

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. Scores are on a scale of 0-100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt.

OurWorld
in Data



Source: Transparency International - CPI

OurWorldInData.org/corruption/ • CC BY-SA

Weak state capacity

- Low ability to extract taxes
- Lack of monopoly of force over state territory
- Few bureaucracies

State autonomy and weak civil society

Hybrid regimes

- Coexistence of informal institutions with the formal trappings of the modern state

What are the historical origins of neopatrimonialism?

Making sense of the relationship between neopatrimonialism and development

- Acemoglu 2005:
 - The state apparatus is controlled by a self-interested ruler
 - The ruler tries to divert resources for her own consumption, but can also invest in socially productive public goods
 - One possible equilibrium:
 - Excessively weak state: The ruler anticipates that he will not be able to extract rents in the future and underinvests in public goods → Lack of development
 - Acemoglu, Daron. 2005. "Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52 (7): 1199–1226.

Consequences of neopatrimonialism



- "The struggle for power was so absorbing that everything else, including development, was marginalized."
 - Ake, Claude. 1996. *Democracy and Development in Africa*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Consequences of neopatrimonialism

Incidence of bribe requests, private sector, 2013

Percent of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment request during 6 transactions dealing with utilities access, permits, licences, and taxes.


OurWorld
in Data



Source: World Bank – Enterprise Survey

OurWorldInData.org/corruption/ • CC BY-SA

Consequences of neopatrimonialism




Consequences of neopatrimonialism

Table A.2. *Africa's Share of Global Economic Activity, 1980–1996 (as a percentage of world total)*

	1980	1996
Population	8.6	10.3
GDP	2.5	1.1
Value added, Manufacturing	1.4	0.9
Merchandise Exports	3.8	1.3
Foreign Direct Investment	0.3	0.6

Source: Calculated from World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, 1998 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998), Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 6.8. Additional data from the World Bank, *African Development Indicators* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997), Table 5.1.

Consequences of neopatrimonialism



Consequences of neopatrimonialism

